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r Warshawski's avatar

With regard to item 13 from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists regarding plutonium and the ease of making a weapon, I asked some people who know about this, including one who was instrumental in assembling a nuclear bomb. Here are some replies:

"Without monstrous cooperation from several insiders at a reprocessing facility, and an amazing array of transport and transfer equipment and facilities, it verges on the impossible, like about 1 in a million probability of success. And that leaves a harder part still undone, which is making the bomb. And, once again, that requires facilities that are capable of being used, undetected, with highly skilled people in the field of nuclear weapons assembly, likely more than an order of magnitude harder than stealing the Pu. And the hardest part is actually deploying the weapon. With today's detection and tracking systems, along with the intelligence about the "weapons people" to be watched and tracked, I suspect that truly becomes impossible in the US."

"...the plutonium in used nuclear reactor fuel is not suited for use in nuclear weapons because it contains too much Pu-240 that would have to be separated from the Pu-239. This is a much more difficult process than uranium enrichment since we are looking at a one- versus three-neutron difference in the isotopes to be "separated." Furthermore, to make reactor-grade plutonium into weapon-grade plutonium is impractical and dangerous. Pu-240 has a fairly high spontaneous fission rate, making it a relatively strong neutron emitter (more dangerous than gamma-ray radiation). Pu-241, also in the reactor-grade plutonium mix, decays to Am-241, which is a strong alpha emitter that poses self-heating problems and radiotoxicity problems if inhaled or ingested. Needless to say, you don't perform these kinds of operations in someone's basement or garage.

The nuclear proliferation issue is a red herring, as used nuclear fuel has been reprocessed outside the U.S. for decades. If obtaining weapon-grade plutonium from reactor-grade plutonium was a realistic option, then why is Iran going to all the trouble to enrich natural uranium rather than just stealing reprocessed plutonium?"

The Bulletin people are hardly scientists. They seem to think that promoting radiophobia will prevent weapon proliferation.

For a more realistc approach to radiaion, please see radiationeffects.org , the website or (true!) Scientists for Accurate Radiation Information.

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Gary Friedman's avatar

Excellent information

Thank you

Gary

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